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Abstract
This paper explores the evolution of the average wage of employees over the life-cycle
of a manufacturing plant. The average wage starts out low for a new plant and
increases along with labor productivity as the plant ages. As a plant approaches exit, its
average wage falls, but more slowly than it rises in the case of growing plants.
Moreover, the average wage does not fall as fast as productivity does. A dynamic
model of labor quality and quantity choice by plants is estimated to assess the costs of
altering labor quality and quantity over the plant life-cycle.
JEL codes: J31, J21, J24, L60, L23, L11, D24
Keywords: The average wage of employees; The evolution of the average wage; Plant
productivity; Plant life-cycle; Employment dynamics; Adjustment costs; Manufacturing
1 Introduction
How does the average wage (the total wage bill per employee) a manufacturing plant pays
to its employees change over the plant’s life-cycle?1 Are there substantial differences in
the time-paths of the average wage between growing versus failing plants? How are the
changes in the average wage related to changes in productivity over the plant’s life-cycle?
The answers to these questions matter for the theories of wage contracts, human capital
accumulation on the job, adjustment costs in factors of production such as labor quan-
tity and quality, the productivity-wage relationship, and the evolution of organizational
complexity and employee hierarchy. This paper provides comprehensive evidence on the
evolution of the average wage along the life-cycle of amanufacturing plant using data from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of Manufactures over the period 1963-1997. Some facts
are presented on how the average wage changes as a plant enters an industry, grows, and
ages, and as it approaches exit. The patterns exhibited by the average wage are tied to the
evolution of labor productivity. A dynamic model of plant-level labor quality and quantity
adjustment is also built and estimated to explore the asymmetric patterns observed in the
evolution of the average wage for growing versus declining plants.
Empirical evidence on the connection between a plant’s age and its average wage is
scant. Brown andMedoff (2003) find that older firms tend to pay higher wages on average.
Their analysis is based on a relatively small number of workers, and highly established,
older firms. Kölling et al. (2013) largely confirm Brown andMedoff ’s (2003) findings using
a larger dataset that links establishments to workers in Germany, while Heyman (2007)
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finds some evidence in favor of a positive relationship using Swedish data. These studies
do not track firms or plants over time, and do not consider the joint dynamics of the
average wage and productivity along the firm life-cycle. In addition, while age measures a
firm’s distance from entry, it does not contain information on its distance to exit, and thus
cannot fully account for where a firm stands in its life-cycle. The samples used in these
previous studies also do not adequately represent the firm age distribution, especially its
left tail.
This paper uses data for the entire set of manufacturing plants available in the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau’s Census of Manufactures (CM) over a span of three decades. It characterizes
the evolution of the average wage and labor productivity as plants move away from their
entry point, and as they approach exit. The findings indicate that new plants start out with
lower average wage and productivity compared with the established ones, but surviving
plants achieve higher productivity and pay higher average wage as they age. Failing plants,
on the other hand, experience a decline in both the average wage and productivity. For
such plants, the average wage does not fall as fast as it rises in the case of surviving new
plants. Furthermore, the average wage neither rises nor falls as fast as labor productivity
does. Compared with the mature plants, failing plants are burdened by an increasingly
larger wage bill as a fraction of their revenues, whereas new entrants and young firms
incur a smaller wage bill relative to their revenues. The asymmetric evolutions of labor
productivity and the average wage over the life-cycle of a plant are the focus of the paper.
The model in this paper connects a plant’s productivity to its average wage. A plant’s
life-cycle dynamics are driven by two random processes: one that drives productivity, and
the other the wage rate per unit of labor quality the plant faces. A plant chooses the quality
and quantity of its labor force in the presence of these two random elements. The motiva-
tion behind labor quality, in addition to quantity, stems from the prior empirical evidence
which suggests that worker quality accounts for a considerable portion of the wage dif-
ferential across plants of different ages.2 A further motivation is the evidence on a strong
positive relationship between a firm’s labor quality and productivity.3 Worker quality can
have alternative interpretations, such as human capital, a worker’s skill, effort, and hours,
or the degree of essentiality of a worker in the production process. A higher quality labor
force comes at a higher average wage. This relationship is supported by the earlier work
of Gort et al. (1990) and Gort et al. (1993), which suggest that variations in the average
wage across plants are mainly due to the differences in human capital rather than the dif-
ferences in the prices of a given labor type. The average wage in the model thus has an
exogenous component that the plant takes as given, and an endogenous component that
depends on the average labor quality, which is chosen by the plant. As a plant’s produc-
tivity increases, its employment or the average quality of its labor force can also increase
depending on the relative costs of these two inputs. Similarly, a decline in productivity
can put a downward pressure on labor quality or employment. However, there are many
frictions in the process of labor quantity and quality adjustment, giving rise to adjustment
costs. These costs can dampen the movements in the average wage in either direction.
Adjustment costs in labor quantity and quality represent the effects of a variety of
considerations, including the frictions in reorganizing production (e.g. plant expansion
and contraction) and the frictions in the labor market (e.g. search costs), the effects of
institutions (e.g. labor unions), and regulations.4 Exogenous shocks to the wage rate per
unit quality of labor can force a plant to alter its average wage at a cost. For instance,
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some workers can exercise their outside options if their wages are not adjusted when
the demand for their services rises in the economy. Plants experiencing fast productivity
growth may need to reorganize their workforce. Such reorganization may involve cre-
ating new jobs and hierarchies, as well as training, and moving labor across ranks and
tasks. Similarly, as a plant experiences persistent episodes of low productivity, it may shed
some of its employees who are non-essential for the main activity of the plant. It may
also reduce worker compensation in real terms. Some workers may also quit in antic-
ipation of the plant’s exit. The plant may then have to reorganize its remaining labor
force to maintain production. All of such events imply costly adjustments to the average
wage.
To assess the magnitude of the adjustment costs associated with the average wage, the
model’s parameters are estimated. The estimates reveal that labor quality, inferred indi-
rectly from the data on employment, wage bill, and revenue, is an important input of
production. Furthermore, there are statistically and economically significant asymmet-
ric adjustment costs. When only the continuing plants are considered, the mean annual
cost of average-wage adjustment in any direction constitutes up to 1.6% of a plant’s rev-
enue at the median of the adjustment cost distribution. For plants adjusting their average
wage downwards, the annual adjustment cost claims, on average, up to 3.6% of revenue.
For plants adjusting their average wage upwards, the annual adjustment cost makes up as
much as 0.8% of revenue on average. These shares are much higher when only the exiting
plants are considered. A version of the model with both the average-wage and employ-
ment adjustment costs is also estimated. A plant may not be able to adjust its average wage
holding employment constant. Similarly, changes in employment can induce changes in
the average wage due to changes in the composition of a plant’s labor force. Allowing for
both channels of adjustment addresses potential biases due to using only one.
This paper contributes in a number of dimensions to the literature on the plant-life
cycle of wages. First, it reveals a set of facts pertaining to the evolution of the average
wage over a plant’s life-cycle. Many prior studies do not analyze how the average wage
changes along the entire plant life-cycle. Second, it explores the role of various frictions,
represented by adjustment costs, in understanding how the average wage changes over a
plant’s life. Third, it considers the dynamic interaction between labor quality and quantity
at the plant level. This interaction has implications for the time-paths of the average wage
and employment, and for the adjustment costs associated with both. Finally, the data used
here is much richer and more complete than those in most of the previous studies.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents
the empirical findings. Section 3 introduces the model. The estimation methodology
is presented in Section 4. The estimation results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 The evolution of the average wage
2.1 Data
The primary data source is the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database
(LRD). The LRD describes several aspects of manufacturing plants’ production, including
the total value of shipments and value added, as well as employment and total wage bill.
The LRD also contains information on the classification and identification of plants, such
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as plants’ ownership, location, and industry, as well as various status codes that identify
birth, death, and ownership changes. These identifying codes are used in developing the
longitudinal plant linkages.6
The analysis focuses on a subset of the LRD that includes eight waves of the Census
of Manufactures (CM): 1963, and 1967-1997 quinquennially. The focus on these years
are driven by the fact that plants are classified consistently into SIC industry codes, for
which there was a substantial revision and transition into NAICS industry codes in 2002.
The number of plants in the CM range from 305,691 in 1967 to 400,036 in 1997. Using
permanent plant numbers, plants were linked from these CM’s to form an unbalanced
panel for the period 1963-1997. Plant entry, exit, and continuation were identified. A plant
is observed at most eight times, when it appears in all waves of the CM.
The variables for the analysis are constructed as follows. A plant’s revenue is its value
of shipments deflated to 1987 dollars using 4-digit SIC level industry price deflators from
the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database based on the 1987 SIC code defini-
tions.7 The deflated value added is also calculated as an alternative measure of revenue,
which is used in the model’s estimation. Employment is a plant’s total number of workers
engaged in production and non-production activities. The main wage variable, the total
wage bill, is deflated to 1987 dollars using CPI from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Using a
plant’s deflated revenue, its deflated wage bill, and its employment, three ratios were con-
structed for each plant-CM wave observation: (a) the average wage – the ratio of the total
wage bill to employment, (b) labor productivity – the ratio of revenue to employment,
and (c) the ratio of the total wage bill to revenue, equivalent to the ratio of (a) to (b). The
empirical analysis describes the life-cycle evolutions of these three ratios.
2.2 Main findings
The life-cycle effects on key plant-level variables are estimated using alternative specifi-
cations of the following OLS regression






βτEEτit + β ′ZZit + ιit + εit , (1)
where i indexes plants, t indexes census years, Yit is either the average wage, labor pro-
ductivity, or the wage-bill-to-revenue ratio, Xτit is an indicator of whether a plant is τ
∈ {0, 5, 10, 15, 20} years to its exit point (the last census it is observed), Eτit is an indicator
of whether a plant is τ ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15, 20} years away from its entry point (the first census
it is observed), and Zit is a vector of plant-level controls.8 A full set of industry-year fixed
effects, ιit , were also added to control for time and industry specific effects, such as the
effects of industry life-cycles and aggregate shocks.9 The omitted category, referred to as
the ‘mature plants’, contains the plants that are more than twenty years away from their
entry or exit, and the plants whose entry or exit do not fall into the sample period. The
error term εit is assumed to be clustered by plant.
Of particular interest are the coefficients βτX and βτE of the life-cycle indicators Xτit and
Eτit , which track the evolution of the dependent variable Yit as a plant moves away from
entry into maturity and as it approaches exit. The coefficients βτX and βτE quantify the
magnitudes of these life-cycle effects. βτX measures how much being τ years away from
exit matters for Yit , controlling for the time from entry as identified by the indicators
Eτit , in addition to other controls. Similarly, βτE measures how much being τ years from
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entry matters for Yit , controlling for the time to exit identified by Xτit , in addition to other
controls.
Specification I in Table 1 generates Figure 1. Consider, first, the evolution of the average
wage in Figure 1a. New plants begin with an average wage that is roughly $2,700 lower
than that of the mature plants. It takes at least twenty years for this gap to drop below
$300. On the other hand, the average wage starts to fall as a plant approaches exit. The
plants that are twenty years away from exit have about $200 lower average wage than the
mature plants. This gap grows to $2,000 by the time of exit. The average wage tends to rise
faster for surviving entrants than they fall for plants approaching exit. This is indicated
by the different slopes of the average wage profiles for the two parts of the life-cycle on
either side of the y -axis.
Next, turn to the evolution of labor productivity in Figure 1b. Compared with the
mature plants, new plants start off with approximately $5,700 productivity disadvantage
that diminishes over time. Failing plants exhibit a much larger productivity disadvan-
tage. Exiting plants have about $10,000 lower productivity. Even as early as ten years
prior to exit, the plants that eventually exit have around $4,000 lower productivity. Labor
productivity tends to fall faster for plants nearing exit than it rises for aging entrants.
Table 1 OLS estimates for the evolution of average wage, labor productivity, and wages to
revenue ratio
Dependent variable: Average wage Revenue/Employment Wage bill/Revenue
($1,000) ($1,000) (%)
Independent variables I II I II I II
Exit -2.031*** -1.846*** -9.852*** -8.962*** 0.675*** 0.598***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.160] [0.157] [0.038] [0.038]
5 years to exit -1.010*** -0.897*** -5.220*** -4.939*** 0.634*** 0.635***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.174] [0.171] [0.042] [0.041]
10 years to exit -0.695*** -0.613*** -3.920*** -3.914*** 0.461*** 0.497***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.219] [0.215] [0.053] [0.052]
15 years to exit -0.447*** -0.412*** -2.566*** -3.010*** 0.273*** 0.369***
[0.031] [0.030] [0.275] [0.269] [0.066] [0.065]
20 years to exit -0.159*** -0.179*** -1.240*** -2.281*** 0.031 0.211**
[0.038] [0.038] [0.347] [0.339] [0.083] [0.082]
Entry -2.714*** -2.356*** -5.668*** -1.998*** -1.733*** -2.236***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.156] [0.155] [0.037] [0.038]
5 years from entry -1.782*** -1.514*** -2.228*** 0.282* -1.247*** -1.580***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.170] [0.168] [0.041] [0.041]
10 years from entry -1.180*** -0.964*** -1.141*** 0.571** -0.653*** -0.865***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.207] [0.204] [0.050] [0.049]
15 years from entry -0.628*** -0.469*** -0.151 0.759*** -0.219*** -0.312***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.239] [0.234] [0.057] [0.057]
20 years from entry -0.229*** -0.120** 1.537*** 1.634*** -0.181** -0.152
[0.044] [0.044] [0.397] [0.389] [0.095] [0.094]
Industry x year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other controls N Y N Y N Y
N 1,219,769 1,219,769 1,219,769 1,219,769 1,219,769 1,219,769
R2 0.29 0.30 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.44
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. (*),(**),(***) indicate significance at 10%,5%,1%, respectively. Other controls include a cubic
spline in plant size (measured by total employment) and an indicator of multi-plant firm. The omitted category is the plants that are
more than twenty years away from their entry or exit, and the plants whose entry or exit points do not fall into the sample period.
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Figure 1 Plant life-cycle evolution of : (a) average wage, (b) labor productivity, (c) average wage to
labor productivity ratio. Notes: The horizontal line at zero represents the normalized value for the omitted
category. Dashed lines are +/− 2 std. errors.
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The findings in Figures 1a and 1b together suggest the evolution of the ratio of a plant’s
wage bill to its revenue, equivalent to the fraction of a worker’s productivity provided to
the worker in the form of wages. The estimated life-cycle path for this ratio is shown in
Figure 1c. New plants spend a lower fraction of their revenue on wage bill compared with
the mature plants, although this gap largely disappears over the next fifteen years for sur-
viving plants. Plants approaching exit, however, exhibit a small but statistically significant
increase in this ratio. Failing plants on average spend a higher fraction of their revenue on
their wage bill compared with the mature plants.
The findings continue to hold when other controls, Zit , are added. Specification II
includes a cubic polynomial in plant size (employment), which is highly positively asso-
ciated with wages (see, e.g., Brown and Medoff (1989)), in addition to an indicator of
whether the plant is part of a multi-unit firm, and location (state) fixed effects. While the
magnitudes of the life-cycle effects for the case of the average wage are now somewhat
smaller in absolute value, their signs and significance resemble those in specification I.
The most important difference is in the case of labor productivity for young plants. Com-
pared with specification I, young plants now exhibit a much faster productivity growth,
and seem to wipe out their productivity disadvantage vis á vis the mature plants by their
fifth year after entry. As a result, the wage-bill-to-revenue ratio for entering plants is now
lower, and stays lower longer as they age.
The overall theme of Table 1 can be summarized as follows. The average wage is low for
entering plants, and gradually approaches that of themature plants. As plants get closer to
exit, the average wage falls, but not as fast as it increases for surviving and aging entrants.
Labor productivity is also much lower for entering plants, but it rises as plants age. Plants
nearing exit have a relative productivity disadvantage, visible even twenty years prior to
exit. Griliches and Regev (1995) find a similar pattern in an early study of Israeli firms
and dub this effect “the shadow of death”: the firms that are due to exit in the future are
less productive in the present.10 The average wage rises slower than labor productivity
does for young plants as they survive and age. It also falls slower than labor productivity
does for failing plants. However, the relative rate of growth in the average wage versus
labor productivity in young plants differs from the corresponding relative rates of decline
in failing plants. This asymmetry manifests itself in the evolution of the wage-bill-to-
revenue ratio. For young plants, the wage bill constitutes a smaller fraction of revenue
compared with the mature plants, whereas plants approaching exit are burdened with a
wage bill that claims a larger fraction of their revenue compared with the mature plants.
The evolutions depicted in Figure 1 can be interpreted as the typical or average evolu-
tions that would take place if a plant goes through all stages of the life-cycle. One concern
is a potential composition bias in these evolutions due to differences in plant life-span.
For instance, short-lived plants may be a special group. They may be born with a much
lower productivity and may live for a period of at most 2 or 3 censuses, and experience
a monotonic decline in average wages and productivity over that period until exit. As a
result, the latter part of the life-cycle trends in Figure 1 may be driven mainly by such
plants. As a further robustness check for the patterns in Figure 1, and as an alternative
to the panel analysis which pools all plants, the evolution of the average wage is plotted
in Figure 2 over the life-span of plants that are born within the sample period and live
for a given number of censuses; a minimum of 2, and a maximum of 6. This longitudinal
analysis ensures that the same set of plants are observed over time for any given life-span.
2013, 2:7
http://www.izajole.com/content/2/1/7
























Figure 2 Plant life-cycle evolution of the average wage by plant life span. Notes: Excess average wage is
measured with respect to the omitted category.
The estimated life-cycle effects in the case of the average wage plotted in Figure 2 are
obtained using a similar regression specification to (1) with only a set of dummies that
indicate the number of years from entry interacted by a life-span dummy.11 The full set
of results for this exercise are in Table 2. The inverted-U shaped pattern in Figure 1a also
emerges for each life-span in Figure 2. Even relatively short-lived plants appear to expe-
rience an increase in the average wage after entry, and a decline before exit. Note also in
Table 2 that the average wage declines slower than productivity does as plants approach
exit, similar to the pattern found in Table 1. The results thus appear to be robust to
life-span considerations.
Table 2 OLS estimates for the evolution of average wage, labor productivity, and wages to
revenue ratio
Wage bill/Revenue
Dependent variable: Average wage ($1,000) Revenue/Employment ($1,000) (%)
Independent variables I II I II I II
Lifespan = 2
Entry -3.490*** -3.042*** -9.638*** -5.740*** -1.159*** -1.661***
[0.035] [0.035] [0.315] [0.310] [0.076] [0.075]
Exit -3.775*** -3.356*** -12.241*** -8.871*** -0.692 *** -1.111***
[0.035] [0.035] [0.315] [0.310] [0.076] [0.075]
Lifespan = 3
Entry -3.134*** -2.713*** -8.227*** -4.762*** -1.125*** -1.561**
[0.047] [0.047] [0.425] [0.417] [0.102] [0.101]
5 years from entry -2.958*** -2.570*** -8.118*** -5.077*** -0.651*** -1.025***
[0.047] [0.047] [0.423] [0.415] [0.101] [0.101]
Exit -3.274*** -2.920*** -11.227*** -9.112*** -0.131 -0.362***
[0.048] [0.048] [0.436] [0.427] [0.104] [0.104]
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Table 2 OLS estimates for the evolution of average wage, labor productivity, and wages to
revenue ratio (Continued)
Lifespan = 4
Entry -2.646*** -2.283*** -6.716*** -4.280*** -0.883*** -1.158***
[0.065] [0.064] [0.584] [0.572] [0.208] [0.139]
5 years from entry -2.501*** -2.157*** -5.009*** -3.662*** -0.773*** -1.043 ***
[0.064] [0.064] [0.579] [0.567] [0.139] [0.138]
10 years from entry -2.390*** -2.078*** -7.191*** -5.444*** -0.132*** -0.305***
[0.064] [0.064] [0.578] [0.566] [0.138] [0.137]
Exit -2.828*** -2.547** -11.091*** -10.172*** 0.391** 0.354**
[0.066] [0.065] [0.592] [0.579] [0.142] [0.140]
Lifespan = 5
Entry -2.397*** -2.081*** -6.466*** -4.957*** -0.838** -0.967**
[0.096] [0.096] [0.868] [0.849] [0.208] [0.206]
5 years from entry -2.142*** -1.824*** -5.009*** -3.140*** -1.003*** -1.196***
[0.096] [0.095] [0.863] [0.845] [0.207] [0.205]
10 years from entry -1.949*** -1.665*** -5.775*** -4.353*** -0.064 -0.192
[0.095] [0.094] [0.854] [0.835] [0.205] [0.203]
15 years from entry -2.036*** -1.469*** -7.734*** -7.087*** 0.328** 0.323*
[0.077] [0.077] [0.698] [0.683] [0.167] [0.166]
Exit -2.489*** -2.120** -10.442*** -10.741*** 0.246 -0.404
[0.141] [0.140] [1.267] [1.240] [0.304] [0.301]
Lifespan = 6
Entry -1.998*** -1.763*** -2.932** -2.692*** -0.458 -0.964***
[0.166] [0.165] [1.497] [1.464] [0.359] [0.356]
5 years from entry -1.853*** -1.581** -2.053 -0.991 -0.896** -0.151
[0.166] [0.165] [1.501] [1.468] [0.360] [0.094]
10 years from entry -1.837*** -1.573*** -4.236** -3.245** -0.018 -0.077
[0.164] [0.163] [1.480] [1.448] [0.355] [0.351]
15 years from entry -1.585*** -1.367** -2.240* -2.192 -0.062 -0.004
[0.162] [0.161] [1.458] [1.426] [0.349] [0.346]
20 years from entry -1.477*** -1.287** -3.559** -3.889*** 0.203 0.351
[0.166] [0.165] [1.494] [1.461] [0.358] [0.354]
Exit -2.179*** -1.998*** -6.112*** -6.792*** 0.181 0.374
[0.167] [0.165] [1.502] [1.469] [0.360] [0.356]
Industry x year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other controls N Y N Y N Y
N 1,219,769 1,219,769 1,219,769 1,219,769 1,219,769 1,219,769
R2 0.29 0.30 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.44
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. (*),(**),(***) indicate significance at 10%,5%,1%, respectively. Life-span indicators were
interacted with life-cycle indicators. Other controls include a cubic spline in plant size (measured by total employment) and an
indicator of multi-plant firm. The omitted category is plants that are at least 20 years from entry and to exit.
3 Themodel
The model is motivated by the empirical findings which suggest an asymmetric evolu-
tion of the average wage for plants experiencing productivity increase versus decline. It
explores the potential role of adjustment costs in the changes in the average wage across
the life-cycle of a plant. Consider an industry with many plants. Both the quantity, L, and
quality, q, of labor are factors of production for a plant.12 Plants can be price-takers in
the output market, or local monopolies which set prices given their downward sloping
demand. There is an infinite number of discrete time periods, denoted by t ≥ 1. Plants
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receive random shocks to their productivity each period. For a plant with employment
L, workers are indexed on the interval [ 0, L] , and the quality of each worker l ∈ [ 0, L]
is q(l). In a competitive labor market, there is a large number of workers with varying
quality levels available for hire at the rate, wt , per unit of quality, which a plant takes
as given.13 The rate wt is subject to random fluctuations over time. There are thus two
distinct channels through which a plant’s average wage can change. First, a plant has to
adjust its wage bill in response to changes in the wage rate per unit of worker quality.
Second, a plant can choose to alter its average worker quality, which also affects its wage
bill.
3.1 Adjustment cost for wages
A plant chooses the number and the average quality of its employees to generate output
using a Cobb-Douglas production technology. The period profit of a plant is
(qt , Lt ; qt−1, Lt−1,wt ,wt−1, θt) = θtLαt qγt −wtqtLt−A(qt , Lt ; qt−1, Lt−1,wt ,wt−1)−F .
(2)
In the production function represented by the first term on the right hand side of (2),




0 q(l)dl, and θt ≥ 0 is a productivity shock that includes aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks, as well as the output price. The production function exhibits decreasing returns,
α+γ < 1. This formulation allows for different elasticities of output with respect to labor
quality and quantity.14
A plant’s total cost per period is represented by the remaining terms on the right hand
side of (2). The first component is the wage bill, wtqtLt . The second component is the
adjustment cost














where λU ≥ 0 and λD ≥ 0 are the parameters of the quadratic adjustment costs asso-
ciated with upward and downward adjustments in the average wage, wtqt , indicated by
IUt ≡ I(wtqt > wt−1qt−1) and IDt ≡ I(wtqt ≤ wt−1qt−1), respectively. The base to which
adjustments in the average wage applies is the wage bill in period t − 1, wt−1qt−1Lt−1.
Changes in the average wage has two sources: changes in wt , and the plant’s choice of qt .
When wt changes, the plant has to incur an adjustment cost in the average wage even
when it does not alter qt .15 Finally, F is a fixed cost of operation that is avoidable only if
the plant exits.
The distribution of θt is given by the c.d.f . Hτ (θt|θt−1), which specifies the general
dependence of the productivity shock on its previous value, and plant age, τ . The life-cycle
effects on productivity are driven by the process Hτ (θt|θt−1). There are several processes
that can generate a life-cycle evolution of productivity similar to the dynamics pictured
in Figure 1b.16 The exact forms of the stochastic processes for θt and wt are not specified,
as such specifications are not needed for the model’s estimation.
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Denote the state variable for a plant by st = (qt−1, Lt−1,wt ,wt−1, θt). The plant makes
its decisions after observing θt and wt . The exit decision is denoted by the discrete choice
Xt ∈ {0, 1} such that Xt = 1 if the plant exits. The value of a plant is then
V (st) ≡ maxXt ,Lt ,qt(1 − Xt) ((qt , Lt ; st) + βE [V (st+1)]) , (4)
where β is the discount factor and the plant’s exit value is normalized to zero. Given
the assumptions of the model so far, dynamic programming arguments in Stokey and
Lucas (1989) guarantee the existence of a unique value function V in (4), which is strictly
increasing in θt . Therefore, exit occurs the first time θt is such that V (st) ≤ 0.
At the beginning of every period, there is a large number (a continuum) of ex-ante
identical potential entrants which can enter the industry by paying a sunk entry cost of
κ > 0. The expected value from entry in any period is Vet = E[V (st)] , where an entrant’s
initial state st = (0, 0,wt ,wt−1, θt) reflects the fact that its prior labor quality and quantity
are both zero.
Let Vi denote the derivative of V with respect to its ith argument where it exists. At an
interior solution, a continuing plant’s choice of Lt satisfies
αθtLα−1t q
γ
t − wtqt + βE [V2(st+1)] = 0, (5)
where


















IUt λU + IDt λD
] (wtqt − wt−1qt−1
wt−1qt−1
)
wtLt−1+βE [V1(st+1)] = 0,
(7)
where

















The first order conditions (5) and (7) implicitly determine a plant’s labor quantity and
quality policies, L(st) and q(st). Let ∗(st) be the period profit evaluated at optimal





if ∗(st) + βE [V (st+1)] > 0,
otherwise.










Using (6) in (9) and rearranging, one obtains
















is the expected value of the adjustment cost as a fraction of period-t wage bill. If the
adjustment costs are zero (λU = λD = 0), the labor’s share of revenue is ft = α – this is
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the ‘static’ labor share when when no dynamic effects are present. An implication of (10)
is that higher expected adjustment in the average wage in the next period is accompanied
by a lower share of labor in current period revenue ( ft < α). Consider now the case where
the policies L(st) and q(st) are both strictly increasing in θt .17 A high (low) productivity
shock then implies an upward (downward) adjustment in both L and q. When λU < λD,
downward adjustments are more costly then upwards adjustments. The average wage in
declining plants can then decrease more slowly than it rises in growing plants. Thus, at+1
can be lower for a plant adjusting downward, implying a higher ft for plants experiencing
decline in productivity.
3.2 Adjustment costs for the average wage and employment
Consider now an adjustment cost for employment, in addition to that for the average
wage. A change in employment may not usually occur holding average worker qual-
ity constant, and vice versa. Incorporating both adjustment margins simultaneously can
therefore account for some of the potential bias when only one of these two costs is
considered. The adjustment costs now read as
























where νU ≥ 0 and νD ≥ 0 are the parameters of the quadratic adjustment cost asso-
ciated with upward and downward employment adjustments, indicated respectively by
JUt ≡ I(Lt > Lt−1) and JDt ≡ I(Lt ≤ Lt−1). Note that the two margins of adjustment are
interrelated. Adjustment in the average wage has an effect on a plant’s current and future
employment, and adjustment in employment influences the current and future average
wage.
For a continuing plant, the first order condition for qt is the same as (7). For Lt , the first
order condition now becomes
αθtLα−1t q
γ
t − wtqt −
[
JUt νU + JDt νD
] (Lt − Lt−1
Lt−1
)
+ βE [V2(st+1)] = 0. (13)
As an alternative specification, adjustment costs which allow for symmetric and
bounded growth rates are also considered. These alternative specifications for the aver-
age wage and employment replace the denominators of the squared terms in (3) and (12)
with 12 (wtqt + wt−1qt−1) and 12 (Lt + Lt−1), respectively. These specifications restrict the
growth rates in the average wage or employment to the interval [−2, 2], and are robust to
outliers and to any biases due to mean reversion in plant employment and wage bill.
4 Estimation
4.1 Adjustment costs for the average wage
Consider first the model with the adjustment costs for the average wage only. Condition





IUt λU + IDt λD
] (wtqt − wt−1qt−1
wt−1qt−1
)
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Multiplication by qt ensures that the average wage, wtqt , appears in the first order con-
dition, rather than just wt . The former can be calculated using a plant’s wage bill and
employment, whereas the latter is not observed. Note that the labor quality qt is also
unobserved. Consequently, the parameters γ , λU , and λD, are identified from employ-
ment, wage bill, and revenue. This approach differs from those that use direct measures
of labor quality based on observable worker characteristics, such as education and expe-
rience. The estimation of parameters associated with labor quality here does not require
a specific measure or index of labor quality, or the estimation of an earnings function.
To implement the estimation, assume that the first order conditions are not exactly ful-
filled, but hold subject to a non-systematic error that may stem from several sources, such
as optimization errors, and the differences between anticipated and realized output price
or the wage rate per unit of quality. These idiosyncratic errors are assumed to be ran-
domly distributed over plants. Following Hansen and Singleton (1982), the ex-post error
can be expressed, using (8) and (14), as a function of the parameters  = {α, γ , λU , λD}
εt() = −γ θtLαt qγt + wtqtLt +
[
IUt λU + IDt λD
















w2t+1q2t+1 − w2t q2t
)
,
The ex-post error in labor choice, after using (5) and (6), is














For exiting plants, the decision variables are not observed for the period after they exit.
However, the event of exit contains additional information, as the probability of exit also
depends on the parameters of interest. Pakes (1994) shows that one can substitute the
discrete exit policy X(st) into the expected discounted future profits, and proceed as in
the case of continuing plants. Thus, for a plant that continues from period t + 1 to t + 2,
X(st+1) = 0 and the ex-post errors are as defined earlier. For a plant that exits in period
t + 1, X(st+1) = 1 and the ex-post errors become
εt() = −γ θtLαt qγt + wtqtLt +
[
IUt λU + IDt λD




ηt() = −αθtLα−1t qγ + wtqt . (18)
Equations (15)-(18) can be used in a generalized method of moments (GMM) frame-
work to estimate the parameters  = {α, γ , λU , λD}. Consider a system of moment
conditions of the form
mεi () = E[ zitεt()]= 0, (19)
mηj () = E[ zjtηt()]= 0,
where zit , zjt denote instrumental variables i = 1, ..., I, j = 1, ..., J . The GMM estima-
tion can be carried out using the empirical counterparts of the I + J moment conditions
in (19). The system used for estimation involves endogenous variables (revenue, employ-
ment, and wage bill) and has four unknown parameters and two equations that determine
ex-post error terms. At least four instruments are needed to estimate the four parameter
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version of the model. The model suggests that the lagged values of decision variables, rev-
enues, value added, and wage bill are predetermined in period t, and hence are orthogonal
to both error terms, εt() and ηt(). Any of these variables and their functions can serve
as an instrument in both types of moment conditions in (19). The instruments used thus
consist of lagged values of revenue, value added, wage bill, the average wage, their squares,
and their interactions.18 It is important to include exiting plants in the estimation as not
doing so can induce bias in both the production function and adjustment cost parameter
estimates. The estimation is done separately for continuing plants and all plants (contin-
uing and exiting) to assess this bias. For each census year t, continuing plants are the ones
that are observed consecutively in years t− 5, t, and t+ 5. Similarly, the exiting plants are
those that are observed in census years t − 5 and t, but not in t + 5. In the estimation,
the discount factor is set to β = 0.78 for the quinquennial data, which corresponds to
β = 0.95 for annual data. The estimation is repeated for the case of the adjustment costs
with alternative growth rates using the corresponding first order conditions.19 For the
estimation, the iterated generalized method of moments estimator of Ferson and Foerster
(1994) was used. Similar results were obtained when nonlinear two stage least squares
estimation was used as an alternative.
4.2 Adjustment costs for the average wage and employment
For the case with both employment and the average-wage adjustment cost, the ex-post
error for Lt is






























The ex-post error for qt is the same as (15).
For exiting plants, the ex-post error for Lt is
ηt() = −αθtLα−1t qγ + wtqt +
[
JUt νU + JDt νD




and the ex-post error for qt is the same as (17). The parameters to be estimated are now
 = {α, γ , λU , λD, νU , νD}. The GMM estimation is carried out for the six parameter
version of the model similar to the case with four parameters. In this case, at least six
instruments are needed, and the instruments described in the previous section are used.
5 Results
5.1 Parameter estimates
The GMM estimates of the parameters using the entire sample of manufacturing plants
are reported in Table 3. Two measures of revenue are used alternatively: the deflated total
value of shipments (top panel) and the deflated value added (bottom panel). Adjustment
costs with both the conventional and the alternative growth rates are considered. The
estimates in specifications I and III pertain only to continuing plants. The estimates in
specifications II and IV pertain to all plants, including the exiting ones. Both the model
with the average-wage adjustment only (specifications I and II), and the model with the
average-wage and employment adjustment (specifications III and IV) are estimated.20
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Table 3 GMM estimates for themodel’s parameters using CM sample
Revenuemeasure: Total value of shipments (deflated)
Adjustment costs Adjustment cost
(conventional growth rate) (alternative growth rate)
Wage Wage and employment Wage Wage and employment
adjustment adjustment adjustment adjustment
Continuing All Continuing All Continuing All Continuing All
plants plants plants plants plants plants plants plants
Parameter (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV)
α 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.14***
[0.0005] [0.0006] [0.002] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.001]
γ 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.42*** 0.18*** 0.13***
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.002] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
λU 2.89*** 2.62*** 10.73*** -0.98*** 5.94*** 14.18*** 1.25*** 2.77***
[0.05] [0.04] [0.41] [0.01] [0.11] [0.15] [0.03] [0.08]
λD 35.61*** 63.10*** 20.81*** 56.48*** 9.55*** 6.30*** 10.10*** 10.46***
[0.25] [0.42] [0.74] [0.33] [0.07] [0.06] [0.12] [0.33]
vU - - 8.62*** 0.56*** - - 1.97*** 13.43***
[0.52] [0.03] [0.42] [0.72]
vD - - 23.17*** 42.91*** - - 8.90*** 88.21***
[4.82] [1.03] [0.12] [1.94]
Revenuemeasure: Value added (deflated)
α 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.27** 0.39***
[0.0005] [0.0008] [0.003] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
γ 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.42***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.0002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
λU 1.39*** 1.00*** 3.73*** 1.38*** 3.44*** 3.25*** 1.04*** -0.54***
[0.04] [0.02] [0.24] [0.04] [0.08] [0.06] [0.03] [0.05]
λD 15.63*** 13.95*** 29.32*** 19.25*** 10.31*** 8.34*** 6.82*** 1.37***
[0.17] [0.20] [0.47] [0.21] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08] [0.22]
vU - - 3.46*** 1.13*** - - 2.03*** 17.74***
[0.28] [0.04] [0.32] [0.79]
vD - - 41.42*** 47.60*** - - 6.69*** 58.32***
[2.70] [0.72] [0.09] [2.20]
N 804,245 986,977 804,245 986,977 804,245 986,977 804,245 986,977
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. (*),(**),(***) indicate significance at 10%,5%,1%, respectively.
In all specifications in Table 3, the estimates for the production function parameters
α and γ have the expected signs, and fall in the interval (0, 1). The average estimated
value of α + γ when revenue is measured by the value of shipments is about 0.37. When
value added is used as the revenue measure in the bottom panel, the estimates of α and γ
are much higher, and still highly significant. The estimates of α + γ average 0.72 across
specifications. The estimated magnitudes of γ are comparable to, and sometimes exceed,
those of α. The importance of labor quality relative to quantity in production accords with
Griliches and Regev’s (1995) and Bahk and Gort’s (1993) findings that labor quality plays
an important role in explaining productivity differences across plants.
In most of the specifications in Table 3, the estimates of the adjustment cost parameters
have the expected signs and they are highly significant.21 The estimates reveal asym-
metry in adjustment costs. Except for one case (specification II with alternative growth
rate), downward adjustment cost parameters are higher than upward adjustment cost
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parameters, both for the average-wage and employment adjustment. The equality of the
upward and downward adjustment cost parameters are rejected at high levels of signifi-
cance across most specifications. Furthermore, the downward adjustment cost parame-
ters are generally larger in absolute value when all plants are considered (specifications
II and IV), compared with the case of continuing plants only (specifications I and III).
This difference suggests that failing plants face higher downward adjustment costs. The
adjustment cost parameter estimates are generally smaller under alternative growth rates.
5.2 The magnitude of the adjustment costs
Because the adjustments in the average wage and employment apply to different bases
in various adjustment cost specifications, it is not appropriate to simply compare the
estimated magnitudes of λU and νU , or λD and νD, to gauge the relative importance of
different adjustment costs. The approach here is to assess the cost of adjustment for the
average wage versus employment by comparing the shares of the wage and employment
adjustment costs in a plant’s initial revenue over a 5-year window between two censuses.
The average annual adjustment costs are calculated over a 5-year period between two
census years t and t + 5, whereas the current revenue is calculated for census year t.
Table 4 presents the quartiles of the revenue shares of adjustment costs based on the
parameter estimates in Table 3. Rather than picking a specification arbitrarily, for each
adjustment cost parameter its maximum estimate across all specifications for the case of
total value of shipments in Table 3 is used to obtain the estimates in Table 4. This approach
provides an upper bound on the revenue share of adjustment costs. Panel (a) considers
estimates from the models using continuing plants only, corresponding to specifications
I and III in Table 3. The estimated revenue shares of adjustment costs are calculated at
the median of the corresponding adjustment cost distribution. For the model with the
average-wage adjustment only, the average annual adjustment cost is 0.8% of revenue
when both directions of adjustment are considered together, and around 0.4% and 2%
when upward and downward adjustments are considered, respectively. For the model
with both the average-wage and employment adjustment, the average-wage adjustment
cost is about 1.0% of revenue, and the upward average-wage adjustment cost constitutes
about 0.6% of revenue, while the downward average-wage adjustment cost makes up
about 1.6% of revenue. The average annual employment adjustment cost has a significant
share, nearly 4%, of revenue when downward employment adjustments are considered.
For upward employment adjustments, this share is about 3%.
A similar pattern emerges in panel (b) of Table 4, which focuses on the estimated param-
eters using all plants, corresponding to specifications II and IV in Table 3. For the model
with the average-wage adjustment only, upward and downward adjustment costs make
up, respectively, about 0.8% and 3.5% of revenue. For the model with both adjustment
margins, these shares are about 0.1% and 3.2%, respectively. For employment adjustment,
upward adjustment cost is about 5.9% of revenue, whereas the downward adjustment cost
constitutes about 8.2% of revenue.
Adjustment costs constitute a much larger fraction of revenue when only the exiting
plants are considered, as panel (c) of Table 4 indicates. For almost all model specifications
and for both upward and downward adjustment, the shares in panel (c) are much higher
compared with panels (a) and (b). These magnitudes suggest that downward adjustment
costs can potentially be a substantial burden for plants, especially for those nearing exit.
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Table 4 Adjustment costs as a percentage of revenue
(a) Estimates using continuing plants only
Model with wage Model with wage and
adjustment only employment adjustment
Adjustment
Cost UpwardDownward Upward Downward
Percentile All UpwardDownward All (Wages) (Wages) (Employment) (Employment)
Wage
Adjustment
25 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3%
50 0.8% 0.4% 2.0% 1.0% 0.6% 1.6%
75 3.7% 1.5% 7.6% 4.2% 2.7% 6.2%
Employment
Adjustment
25 0.6% 0.6% 0.5%
50 3.2% 2.9% 3.8%
75 14.3% 12.6% 16.9%
(b) Estimates using all plants: Continuing plants only
Model with wage Model with wage and
adjustment only employment adjustment
Adjustment
Cost UpwardDownward Upward Downward
Percentile All UpwardDownward All (Wages) (Wages) (Employment) (Employment)
Wage
Adjustment
25 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6%
50 1.6% 0.8% 3.5% 0.4% 0.1% 3.2%
75 7.4% 3.5% 13.4% 3.4% 3.9% 2.9%
Employment
Adjustment
25 1.2% 1.2% 1.1%
50 6.7% 5.9% 8.2%
75 29.9% 26.0% 35.9%
(c) Estimates using all plants: Exiting plants only
Model with wage Model with wage and
adjustment only employment adjustment
Adjustment
Cost UpwardDownward Upward Downward
Percentile All UpwardDownward All (Wages) (Wages) (Employment) (Employment)
Wage
Adjustment
25 0.5% 0.2% 1.3% 0.1% 0.0% 1.1%
50 3.0% 1.2% 6.7% 0.9% 0.1% 6.0%
75 14.2% 5.3% 25.7% 7.9% 0.5% 23.0%
Employment
Adjustment
25 2.4% 1.8% 3.4%
50 14.8% 10.0% 22.4%
75 70.6% 48.5% 94.7%
Howmuch do adjustment costs in the average wage change over the life-cycle of a plant?
The evolution of adjustment costs along the plant life-cycle is depicted in Figure 3 for
continuing plants. These estimates are based on the largest adjustment cost parameter
estimates from the model with wage adjustment cost only using all plants, corresponding
to specifications labelled II in the left panel of Table 3. These specifications also generate
the left side of panel (b) in Table 4. For the plants that are five years from their first census,
the average-wage adjustment cost makes up about 2.3% of revenue annually at the median
adjustment cost. This share increases slightly as new plants age and then declines to just
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Figure 3 Plant life-cycle evolution of wage adjustment cost as a share of revenue. Estimates based on
the model with wage adjustment (continuing plants only).
below 1.6% by the time a plant is 20 years away from entry. Somewhat reversal of this
pattern is observed for the plants approaching exit. The average-wage adjustment cost
grows to about 2.2% of a plant’s revenue five years before its exit, doubling from about
1.1% when a plant stands twenty years from exit.
5.3 Estimation using annual data
The estimates for annual adjustment costs were so far obtained using data in CM,
which has quinquennial frequency. A longer time period between two consecutive obser-
vations of a plant could lead to lower adjustment cost estimates, as plants may have
more flexibility to adjust over a longer horizon. If adjustment costs are highly con-
vex, plants would tend to spread adjustments over time. The estimation is repeated
using annual frequency data from the US Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manu-
factures (ASM) for the period 1972-2009. As in the case of the CM, plants are linked
over time. The unbalanced panel constructed from the ASM has a number of impor-
tant differences from the panel from the CM. First, ASM pertains mainly to the relatively
large plants.22 Furthermore, a plant may enter to or drop from the ASM panel sim-
ply because its size changes to a level that is above or below the threshold of inclusion
with certainty in the ASM. Second, the sampling frame for the ASM changes every five
years, implying that some plants may enter, whereas others may be dropped from the
sample over time. Therefore, actual plant entry/exit do not necessarily coincide with
entry to/exit from the sample. The results based on the ASM thus may differ from the
ones based on the CM for reasons in addition to the differences in the frequency of
observation.23
The results from the GMM estimation based on the ASM panel are in Table 5. Sample
weights in the ASM are used to obtain the population estimates. The results appear to
be qualitatively similar across Table 3 and Table 5. Most importantly, downward adjust-
ment costs are still larger than upward adjustment costs, and upward adjustment costs
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Table 5 GMM estimates for themodel’s parameters using ASM sample
Revenuemeasure: Total value of shipments (deflated)
Adjustment costs Adjustment cost
(conventional growth rate) (alternative growth rate)
Wage Wage and employment Wage Wage and employment
adjustment adjustment adjustment adjustment
Continuing All Continuing All Continuing All Continuing All
plants plants plants plants plants plants plants plants
Parameter (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV)
α 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.09***
[0.00006] [0.00006] [0.002] [0.0001] [0.00007] [0.00006] [0.0004] [0.0001]
γ 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.31*** 0.18*** 0.12***
[0.00007] [0.00012] [0.00008] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]
λU 3.72*** 1.72*** 3.44*** 0.83*** 1.45*** 1.32*** 1.56*** 1.31***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008]
λD 1.31*** 2.33*** 2.76*** 1.46*** 18.82*** 2.89*** 19.73*** 2.89***
[0.008] [0.002] [0.009] [0.001] [0.052] [0.007] [0.049] [0.007]
vU - - 0.64*** 2.77*** - - 1.53*** 1.77***
[0.21] [0.14] [0.538] [0.221]
vD - - 96.39*** 32.65*** - - 44.39*** 43.49***
[40.5] [6.0] [15.6] [1.94]
Revenuemeasure: Value added (deflated)
α 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33***
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0003]
γ 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.17***
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0003]
λU 0.77*** 1.14*** 2.33*** 0.33*** 1.73*** 1.17*** 1.44*** 1.21***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004]
λD 1.93*** 1.24*** 2.88*** 0.24*** 12.16*** 1.81*** 14.39*** 1.82***
[0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.04] [0.006] [0.041] [0.006]
vU - - 0.62*** 0.33*** - - 1.52*** 1.48***
[0.221] [0.113] [0.741] [0.255]
vD - - 99.48*** 32.84*** - - 86.32*** 37.10***
[22.0] [6.2] [14.2] [7.2]
N 3,926,908 3,927,407 3,926,908 3,927,407 3,926,908 3,927,407 3,926,908 3,927,407
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. (*),(**),(***) indicate significance at 10%,5%,1%, respectively. Number of observations reflect
sampling weights used.
are generally small for both the average wage and employment. However, there are a few
important differences. First, in Table 5 the estimates of the production function param-
eters α and γ are generally smaller. This discrepancy could be driven by the fact that
the plants in the sample used for the results in Table 5 are much larger, and may have
different production technologies compared with the smaller ones in the sample used
for the results in Table 3. Second, the estimates of the downward employment adjust-
ment cost parameters are much larger compared with those in Table 3, whereas the
estimates of the downward average-wage adjustment cost parameters have comparable
magnitudes.
5.4 A comparison with the prior findings
In general, the empirical regularities documented here agree with the earlier findings
based on data from other countries and periods of time. Brixy et al. (2007) use the
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matched employee-employer data in Germany for the period 1997-2001, and find that
the average wage is lower in new firms but rises as firms get older, similar to the findings
here. Audretsch et al. (2001) also analyze the connection between wages, productivity
and firm age in Netherlands, and obtain similar findings. The “shadow-of-death” effect,
i.e. lower productivity observed in failing firms even many years before they exit, is also
noted in a recent study by Carreira and Teixeira (2011) using data on Portuguese firms.
Fackler et al. (2013) also find a similar effect in the cases of East and West Germany.
In the case of French manufacturing firms over the period 1990-2002, Bellone et al.
(2006) document that mature firms that have lower and declining productivity compared
with other mature firms tend to exit with higher likelihood. They also observe that the
growth of new entrants is gradual, and it takes time for them to catch-up with the mature
firms. Combined with the findings for the U.S. documented here, these prior studies
suggest that the life-cycle evolution of productivity and wages tend to be similar across
countries.
How do the estimates of adjustments costs compare with some of the prior find-
ings in the literature? There does not exist a sizeable prior literature on the estimation
of the adjustment costs for the average wage, or individual wages. However, several
studies have provided estimates of labor adjustment costs. These studies span a vari-
ety of model structures, samples, and aggregations, making the comparison inherently
difficult. Nevertheless, most studies find positive labor adjustment costs, based on dif-
ferent specifications. Adjustment costs are positive and significant in studies using a
quadratic or higher-order specification with or without interactions among different
adjustment margins.24 The estimates of labor adjustment costs here are within the range
of the estimates found in these previous studies, though there is strong evidence of
asymmetric adjustment costs here. The estimates indicate relatively large downward
employment adjustment costs compared with the upward adjustment costs. This asym-
metry in labor adjustment was also found in earlier work by Jaramillo et al. (1993) using
large firms in Italy for the period 1958-1988, and by Nilsen et al. (2007) in the case
of Norwegian manufacturing plants for the period 1986-1995. Kramarz and Michaud
(2010) also present evidence of asymmetry in hiring versus terminating costs in the case
of French establishments. Furthermore, as shown in Table 4, the average-wage adjust-
ment costs are smaller when the average-wage adjustment costs are estimated together
with the employment adjustment costs, suggesting that not controlling for labor quantity
adjustments may introduce bias in the adjustment cost estimates for labor quality, and
vice versa.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigated the dynamics of the average wage paid to employees along the life-
cycle of a manufacturing plant. Some stylized facts emerge. New plants start with a lower
average wage comparedwith themature plants. A surviving plant’s average wage increases
and catches up with those of the mature plants. The average wage of a plant approaching
exit falls, but not as steeply as it rises in the case of surviving new plants. The total wage
bill constitutes a lower fraction of a young and growing plant’s revenue, because its aver-
age wage does not increase as fast as it labor productivity does. For plants approaching
exit, the average wage does not fall as fast as labor productivity does, implying that a
higher fraction of revenue must be dedicated to wage bill.
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Amodel of plant-level dynamics was introduced to explore the potential role of frictions
in the form of adjustment costs in the average wage. In the model, changes in the aver-
age wage result from both changes in average labor quality and changes in the wage rate
per unit of quality. The estimated parameters of the model reveal evidence of asymmet-
ric adjustment costs for the average wage. The estimated upper bounds on the revenue
share of the average-wage adjustment costs indicate economic significance of such costs
at the plant level, especially those associated with downward adjustment. The estimates
remain economically significant when the average-wage adjustment cost is considered
jointly with the employment adjustment cost.
The relatively high cost of adjusting the wage bill downward when a plant’s productiv-
ity falls persistently may increase the likelihood of exit and speed up the demise of failing
plants. Further research can quantify the importance of these costs in exit. Such effects
can potentially be larger in the case of plants in Europe, which tend to face stricter labor
regulations than in the U.S. The movements in the average wage at the plant level can also
be decomposed further. A challenge is to separately measure the cost of adjustments in
the wage rate per unit of labor quality, and the cost of adjustments due to changes in aver-
age labor quality only. Finally, the co-evolution of the average wage and labor quality also
suggest a theory of plant life-cycle that emphasizes organizational complexity and hierar-
chy. For instance, new plants may start with a simple worker hierarchy that progressively
becomes more complex with the addition of workers of higher quality and wages. Plant
decline triggers a sluggish dismantling of this hierarchy and slow reduction in labor costs
due to potentially high costs of changing the employee composition and wages.
Endnotes
1 Throughout this paper, the term “average wage” refers to a plant’s total wage bill per
employee, not the average hourly wage rate of employees. The average hourly wages are
not available in the data used here.
2 See, e.g., Brown and Medoff (2003) and Kölling et al. (2013), Griliches and Regev
(1995), and Bahk and Gort (1993). The analysis here does not attempt to disentangle the
effect of worker versus plant characteristics on wages.
3 See, e.g., Bahk and Gort (1993) and Griliches and Regev (1995).
4 Unions in manufacturing, while much weaker in recent times, were effective for
much of the sample period used in this paper, which goes back to 1963. Union presence
in a plant could thus have played a role in the volatility of plant-level average wage in the
earlier part of the sample period. Unfortunately, there does not exist a comprehensive
data on the union status of plants in the U.S.
5 Most prior work focus on employment and capital adjustment, and either use
relatively small samples or non-representative samples from the U.S. firm population.
Other studies use aggregate data, which may hide patterns at the micro level. Examples
of prior work include, among others, Alonso-Borrego (1998), Shapiro (1986), Pfann and
Palm (1993), Hall (2004), and Merz and Yashiv (2007).
6 See also http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/economicdata.html.
7 See http://www.nber.org/data/nbprod2005.html.
8 The total employment of a plant was restricted to the range 5 to 10, 000 employees.
In addition, the top and bottom percentiles of the three dependent variables were
trimmed to reduce the influence of any outliers.
9 The regression specifications are similar to those used in Foster et al. (2008).
10 Such effects were also found in studies using data from other countries. See, e.g.,
Carreira and Teixeira (2011), Fackler at al. (2013), and Bellone et al. (2006).
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11 The time-to-exit indicators are excluded in these regressions, as including them
together with the time-from-entry indicators would lead to collinearity with the
life-span indicator.
12 Worker quality, q, can have alternative interpretations, such as a worker’s skill level,
human capital, effort (including hours worked), or the degree of essentiality of a worker
in production.
13 This wage rate is allowed to be plant-specific, reflecting, for instance, the plant’s
local labor market conditions.
14 When there are no adjustment costs, the elasticity of output with respect to labor
quantity and quality must be the same (α = γ ) for interior maximizers to exist for the
plant’s optimization problem. The presence of adjustment costs that differ across factors
breaks this constraint, and allows interior maximizers when α = γ .
15 These two different adjustments are not separately identified in the data used here.
16 Suppose that the productivity of new entrants have c.d.f . H0(θt). Subsequent
productivity draws come from Hτ (θt|θt−1), which is strictly decreasing in θt−1, and
H1(θt+1|θt) < H0(θt) for all θt . There can also be age effects, e.g. Hτ (θt|θt−1) is strictly
decreasing in τ for τ < τ and strictly increasing in τ for τ > τ , for some τ ≥ 1. An
entrant thus starts with a productivity that is lower, in a first-order-stochastic sense,
than that of an age-1 incumbent. A surviving plant’s next period productivity is higher in
a first-order-stochastic sense, the higher its current period productivity. Such a process
can generate the gradual decline in average productivity of failing plants prior to exit,
and the gradual increase in average productivity of surviving plants following entry. See
Hopenhayn (1992) [Section 5] for a general characterization of stochastic processes that
can generate the observed evolutions of productivity.
17 Such monotonicity holds under certain restrictions on the parameters of the model.
18 The results were not significantly different when twice-lagged versions of the
variables were also used as instruments.
19 The first order conditions for this case are available upon request.
20 In all specifications in Table 4, the top and bottom 1% of the plant level
distributions of average wage, wage bill-to-revenue ratio, and labor productivity were
trimmed to reduce the influence of some major outliers. The total employment of a
plant was also restricted to the range 5 to 10, 000 employees.
21 In two cases, the estimated upward adjustment cost parameters are negative, with
small absolute values. These cases also emerge in some prior work with quadratic
adjustment costs (e.g. Hall (2004)) and may result from a combination of remaining
outliers in the data and measurement error. An implicit constraint on the adjustment
cost parameters is non-negativity. As a robustness check, the model was re-estimated
subject to these constraints. If the model’s specification is not largely at odds with the
data, moving from the unconstrained to the constrained estimation should not result in
drastic sign and significance changes in other parameters. The constrained estimates
were zero for the negative parameter estimates in Table 3, and the other parameter
values were very similar to those in Table 3.
22 The Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) is a sample survey of approximately
50,000 establishments. A new sample is selected at 5-year intervals beginning the
second survey year subsequent to CM. Large plants are sampled with certainty, and
smaller plants are sampled according to a stratified random sampling with probabilities
that vary with plant size. See http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/how_the_
data_are_collected/index.html.
23 A minimum plant size requirement of 50 employees is imposed to ensure that the
estimation is not unduly influenced by smaller plants.
24 See, e.g., Shapiro (1986), Pfann and Palm (1993), Alonso-Borrego (1998), and Merz
and Yashiv (2007)), with the exception of Hall (2004), who finds quadratic costs that are
not significantly different from zero using sector level data.
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